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I. Introduction 
 This Rhode Island Sea Grant Law Fellow report was prepared for the Newport 
Waterfront Commission of Newport, Rhode Island (Commission).  It discusses legal and policy 
issues surrounding Newport‟s boat mooring ordinances and practices.  The great importance of 
moorings to Newport‟s residents and tourists necessitated this report. 
Moorings greatly enhance the economies of Newport and of the state of Rhode Island.  
Research on Rhode Island tourism in 2006 confirmed that tourism employed 10% of Rhode 
Islanders.
1
  This includes tourism-supported businesses, like restaurants and hotels, which 
receive up to 40% of their revenue from tourism.
2
  Tourism in Newport is particularly dependent 
on water access.  A 2010 economic study concluded that “activities on the water and public 
access to the water define the overall attractiveness of Newport Harbor.”3  Water-facilitated 
tourism in turn contributes to the taxable sales and property values of many businesses, 
especially from Newport‟s many restaurants, entertainment, and hotel businesses.4 
In the United States, there is an “increased population adjacent to coastal waters [and] 
tourism and recreational use…is increasing.”5  Newport is on the forefront of this national 
phenomenon.  The high demand for moorings is demonstrated in Newport‟s 474 applicant 
waiting list, which amounts to a minimum waiting time of 10-15 years, increasing as demand 
grows.
 6
  On the average, 10 to 15 moorings become available for new applicants each year.
7
  
The rising numbers of registered boats, the lack of slip space, and the stress on public launching 
ramps intensify the need for moorings.
8
  The state carries a load of 3,000 applicants waiting for 
                                                          
1
 Kenneth McGill, How Important is Tourism to Rhode Island?  2006 Tourism Satellite Account, (Global Insight 
2006), available at http://www.visitrhodeisland.com/pdf/2006_TSA_Report.pdf. 
2
 Id. 
3
 FXM Associates, The Contribution of Waterfront Land Uses to Municipal Revenues in Newport, Rhode Island 
(Aug 2010), available at  http://www.cityofnewport.com/departments/planning-zoning/pdf/Harbor_Summary_08-
06-2010.pdf. 
4
 Id. (“The patrons of activities and uses on the water (especially recreational boaters and excursion vessel 
customers) spend considerable amounts at waterfront area businesses and, therefore, contribute to the taxable 
property value and sales of commercial uses such as restaurants and retail shops”). 
5
 Barbara A. Vestal, Dueling with Boat Oars, Dragging through Mooring Lines: Time for More Formal Resolution 
of Use Conflicts in States’ Coastal Waters? 4 Ocean & Coastal L.J. 1, 4 (1999). 
6
 Personal Communication with Hank Kniskern (E-mail received April 27
th
, 2010). 
7
 Id. 
8
 Climbing boat registration rates have exceeded other New England states and even the national average.  See 
Aquidneck Island Planning Commission, West Side Task Force, Aquidneck Island West Side Master Plan, Chapter 
4, Planning Context, pg. 5 (2005), available at http://www.aquidneckplanning.org/westsidemast.html.   
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slip space.
9
  The Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council has recognized these 
issues, stating: 
The growth in the size of the recreation fleet, limited berthing opportunities and the increasing expense of 
in-water storage have contributed to rapid growth in the number of trailered boats.  This has placed a heavy 
demand on public launching ramps, which are in short supply and many of which are in deteriorating 
condition or have limited parking capacity.
10
 
Given the centrality of water access to Newport‟s economy and the increasing demands it will 
experience, responsible management of available mooring spaces is crucial.   
This report facilitates the timely discussion of Newport‟s regulatory system for moorings 
by providing background legal and policy information.  One of the Commission‟s most 
fundamental concerns has been understanding the Public Trust Doctrine (PTD) and its 
application to boat moorings in Newport.  This report addresses this concern against the 
backdrop of the regulatory controls on Newport‟s decision-making in Section II.  The more 
specific application of public trust principles to moorings depends on two primary legal 
questions: (1) the nature of the property interest a mooring holder has in his or her mooring 
permit and (2) the interaction between moorings and the general public‟s right to use public trust 
waters, each of which is examined in Section IV (A) and (B), respectively.  Additionally, this 
report explores some key specific aspects of Newport‟s mooring scheme: the commercial-
individual mooring ratio; the resident-nonresident ratio; mooring underutilization; and mooring 
fee profits.
11
   
II.  Rhode Island’s Public Trust and Regulatory Framework  
This section explains the principles and foundations of the PTD in the United States and 
its adoption by Rhode Island.  It explores the role of the doctrine in defining federal, state, and 
local regulatory responsibilities.  This section also serves as a background for delineating the 
relationship between government actors that play a role in public trust administration. 
                                                          
9
 Id., citing Rhode Island Marine Trades Association. 
10
 Coastal Resources Management Council, Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Program §200.3 
(December, 2010), available at http://www.crmc.ri.gov/regulations/RICRMP.pdf (The Red Book). 
11
 Please note that the terms license and permit are used interchangeably in this report. Permit is defined as “a 
certificate evidencing permission; a license.” Black‟s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).  A license is defined as “a 
permission, usu. revocable, to commit some act that would otherwise be unlawful…” Id. 
Please also note that “commercial moorings” refers to a classification of moorings that can be used for rental 
moorings.  This is the official language used in the Newport mooring ordinance.   
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The PTD was developed from the natural law principle and universal understanding that 
some natural resources are so important to society that they are “incapable of individual 
exclusive appropriation”.12  One of the underpinnings of the PTD is that “water, being a vital and 
uncultivable resource, should be free of the monopolizing effect of private ownership.”13  In 
accordance, the law developed to vest the states, rather than private parties, with title to 
submerged land.  The states serve as “trustees” to protect the public‟s right to use the waters 
above those lands.
14
   
In England, title to tidal water was vested in the King, to hold for the “benefit of the 
nation.”15  That title had two components: “jus privitum” (the government‟s title) and “jus 
publicum” (the public‟s interest, the right to use).  The jus publicum created a regulatory 
responsibility for the government to administer the trust in the public‟s best interest.  The jus 
privitum was transferred from the King to each of the original states upon the American 
Revolution
16
 and to the remaining states upon succession.
17
   
The United States Congress clarified that the states, rather than the federal government, 
are the trust administrators when it enacted the Submerged Lands Act (SLA).
18
  The SLA 
extends the state‟s police powers to a distance three miles from the shore, providing it with 
regulatory power over its public trust waters.
19
  In doing so, Congress recognized that the best 
way to manage public trust resources was state-by-state.  Moreover, the United States Supreme 
                                                          
12
 Berkeley v. Super. Ct. of Alameda County, 606 P.2d 362, 364 (Cal. 1980). 
13
 Mark Cheung, Comment, Dockominiums: an Expansion of Riparian Rights that Violates the Public Trust 
Doctrine, 16 B.C. Envtl. Aff .L. Rev. 821, 836 (1989), citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894).  See 
Shively, available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/152/1/case.html.  See, also, Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. 
Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 358 (Mass. 1979)  (“Throughout history, the shores of the sea have been 
recognized as a special form of property of unusual value and therefore subject to different legal rules from those 
which apply to inland property). 
14
 Trustee is “one who stands in a fiduciary or confidential relation to another; esp., one who, having legal title to 
property, holds it in trust for the benefit of another [the public as applied here] and owes a fiduciary duty to that 
beneficiary [the public].”  Black‟s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).  See, also, 90 C.J.S. Trusts §1 (West 2011) 
(providing a useful definition of trust as the “beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in 
another”).  
15
 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894), available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/152/1/case.html. 
16
 Id.  Also note that the American concept of public trust differs from the English common law in its definition of 
the “ordinary high tide” line as the “edge of the sea”.  Id. 
17
 This concept is called the “equal footing doctrine” and is explained in Shively v. Bowlby, Id.  See also Black‟s 
Law Dictionary (9
th
 ed. 2009) (defining the equal footing doctrine as “the principle that a state admitted to the Union 
after 1789 enters with the same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction within its borders as did the original 13 states.”) 
18
 43 U.S.C.A. § 1311 (West 2011); 43 U.S.C. § 1311, available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/uscode43/usc_sec_43_00001311----000-.html. 
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Court recognized the special importance of local administration of harbors.
20
  The principle of 
local harbor autonomy has further developed in courts throughout the United States and has been 
specifically applied to moorings.
21
  The First Circuit Court of Appeals, which has jurisdiction 
over Rhode Island, shared in this view when it held that boat user fee regulations were not pre-
empted by any federal law.
22
 Thus, as a general rule, mooring regulations are largely left to state 
and local governments.  At the same time, the federal government is not without a limited role in 
the administration of local harbors, an issue explored at the end of section II. 
State and local governments have discretion in interpreting the PTD.
23
  The United States 
Supreme Court provided a starting point for states in the development of state public trust law in 
the case of Illinois Central.
24
  Illinois Central‟s central guidelines are “considered the foundation 
of the public trust doctrine in United States law.”25  The standards in that case provide a 
minimum “floor” for determining state public trust obligations.26  In other words, the state must 
follow Illinois Central‟s basic protections of the public trust, but may also add an additional layer 
of protection with state common law, statutes, or administrative regulations.
27
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
19
 43 U.S.C.A. § 1312 (West 2011); 43 U.S.C. § 1312, available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/33/usc_sec_33_00001312----000-.html.   
20
Cushing v. Owners of The John Fraser, 62 U.S. 184, 187-188 (1858), available at 
http://supreme.justia.com/us/62/184/case.html.  See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), available at 
http://supreme.justia.com/us/22/1/case.html. 
21
  “There is no reason to believe that Congress intended to occupy the field in the area of mooring” Beveridge v. 
Lewis, 939 F.2d 859, 864 (9
th
 Circ. 1991), available at http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/939/939.F2d.859.90-
55642.html; “anchorage and mooring are not subject areas that are particularly federally sensitive in nature” Barber 
v. Hawaii Hawaiian Navigable Waters Preservation Soc‟y, 42 F.3d 1185, 1194 (9th Circ. 1994), available at 
http://openjurist.org/42/f3d/1185/barber-v-state-of-hawaii-hawaiian-navigable-waters-preservation-society. 
22
 LCM Enter. v. Dartmouth, 14 F.3d 675, 684 (1
st
 Circ. 1994), available at 
http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/14/14.F3d.675.93-1536.html.   
23
 See Dennis W. Nixon, Evolution of Public and Private Rights to Rhode Island’s Shore, 24 Suffolk. U. L. Rev. 
313, 327 (1999) (referring to Phillips Petroleum, “the decision appears to give states substantial flexibility in the 
definition and scope of their public trust authority").  See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 
(1988), available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/484/469/index.html. 
24
 See Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 394 (1926) (explaining that Illinois Central “was necessarily a 
statement of Illinois law” but emphasizing that the “general principle and exception [of Illinois Central] has been 
recognized the country over”), available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/271/364/case.html.  See Illinois Cent. R.R. 
v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/146/387/. 
25
 Dennis W. Nixon, Evolution of Public and Private Rights to Rhode Island’s Shore, 24 Suffolk. U. L. Rev. 313, 
320 (1999). 
26
 Crystal A. Chase, The Illinois Central Public Trust Doctrine and Federal Common Law: An Unconventional 
View, 16 Hastings W.-N.W. J. Envtl. L. & Pol‟y 113, 150, 159 (2010).  ( “State courts‟ use of state constitutional 
provisions to articulate or expand the public trust does not run contrary to the theory of Illinois Central as grounded 
in federal law.  Instead, these interpretations are compatible with an understanding of Illinois Central as establishing 
a federal common law “floor” limitation on state power, upon which states are free to expand using state law.”) 
27
See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894), available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/152/1/case.html. 
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Under Illinois Central, states can convey some property rights in public trust waters to 
private parties, but the state‟s jus publicum responsibility cannot be extinguished.28  The state‟s 
management of tidelands is thus unalienable.
29
  Proper administration of the jus publicum trust 
further requires that, before granting any property interest to a private party, the government 
determines (a) the conveyance is itself in furtherance of a public interest, or (b) the conveyance 
has no substantial impairment to the public interest in the tidelands.
30
   
Rhode Island‟s public trust protection closely parallels Illinois Central.  The Rhode Island 
Constitution incorporates the PTD in the state Constitution, explicitly recognizing the public‟s 
“rights to the use and enjoyment of the natural resources of the state.” 31  While the public‟s right 
to use traditionally consisted of a triad of fishing, navigation, and commercial rights
32
, the Rhode 
Island Constitution also protects public fishing, swimming and collecting seaweed.
 33
   
Additionally, the 1971 Rhode Island General Assembly passed a law that no absolute title 
may be transferred to private parties except by explicit grant by the General Assembly after 
finding such transfer consistent with public trust uses.
34
  With regard to leasing public trust 
resources, the statute provides that before any lease of tidal land or license for exclusive use can 
be granted to private parties, it must be “specifically approved for public trust purposes.”35  In 
other words, it requires compatibility with the PTD.  The lease compatibility determination can 
be made by either the General Assembly or a designated government body.
36
  Because 
delegation provision does not offer specific guidance with regards to moorings, it is unclear 
exactly which government body is responsible for the PTD compatibility determination.  The 
issue is complicated by the interaction of the Coastal Resources Management Council‟s (CRMC) 
regulatory authority with that of the City of Newport. 
                                                          
28
 See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892), available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/146/387/. 
29
 Id. See also Berkeley v. Super. Ct. of Alameda County, 26 Cal.3d 515, 521, 606 P.2d 362, 365 (Cal. 1980) 
(discussing Illinois Central, “the decision established the principle that a state, as administrator of the trust in 
tidelands on behalf of public, does not have the power to abdicate its role as trustee in favor of private parties”).   
30
 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892), available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/146/387/.    
31
R.I. Const. art. I, § 17 (West 2011), available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/RiConstitution/C01.html.  See also 
Champlin‟s Realty Assoc. v. Tillson, 823 A.2d 1162, 1166 (R.I. Sup. Ct. 2003). 
32
 See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894), available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/152/1/case.html. 
33
 See R.I. Const. art. I, § 17 (West 2011), available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/RiConstitution/C01.html. 
34
 R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-5-1.2(a) (West 2011), available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/TITLE46/46-5/46-5-
1.2.HTM. 
35
 R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-5-1.2(b) (West 2011), available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/TITLE46/46-5/46-5-
1.2.HTM. 
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The General Assembly has generally delegated all the regulatory responsibility over 
coastal resources to CRMC.
 37
  This delegation makes CRMC the administrator of Rhode 
Island‟s public trust waters.38  Thus, the agency serves as the “principle mechanism for 
management of the state‟s coastal resources.”39 One exception to CRMC‟s “exclusive 
jurisdiction”40 over coastal resources is that the General Assembly specifically delegated the 
mooring licensing authority to certain harbor cities.
 41
  Accordingly, Newport has been delegated 
the power to determine the number, placement, and use of permanent and temporary moorings, 
the assignment and removal of moorings, minimum mooring specifications, and fees.
42
  Newport 
exercises this power through the city ordinances and enforcement by the harbormaster.  Just as 
the CRMC‟s enabling statute placed the agency in “the role of public trustee for the state‟s 
coastal resources,”43 Newport is required to comply with the PTD when administering its 
mooring ordinances.
44
     
Because CRMC retains jurisdiction over non-mooring aspects of Newport Harbor, the 
interaction between the two government entities is important.  CRMC‟s governance overlaps 
with Newport‟s in two respects: (1) the requirement of CRMC approval for Harbor Management 
Plans, and (2) jurisdiction over permits that include moorings plus other uses, activities, or 
structures that are outside the scope Newport‟s jurisdiction.  The City of Newport is therefore 
required to have a CRMC-approved Municipal Harbor Management Plan in order to ensure 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
36
 R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-5-1.2(b) (West 2011), available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/TITLE46/46-5/46-5-
1.2.HTM. 
37
 R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-23-6 (West 2011), available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/Title46/46-23/46-23-
6.HTM 
38
 Dennis W. Nixon, Evolution of Public and Private Rights to Rhode Island’s Shore, 24 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 313, 
323-324 (1990) (explaining that CRMC “clearly assumed the role of public trustee for the state‟s coastal 
resources”). 
39
 Coastal Resources Management Council, Ocean Special Area Management Plan § 1020.1(3) (October 19, 2010), 
available at http://www.crmc.ri.gov/samp_ocean/finalapproved/RI_Ocean_SAMP.pdf. 
40
 Coastal Resources Management Council, Ocean Special Area Management Plan 1020.1 (3) (October 19, 2010), 
available at http://www.crmc.ri.gov/samp_ocean/finalapproved/RI_Ocean_SAMP.pdf. 
41
 See, e.g. R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-4-6.6 (West 2011) (Newport), available at 
http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/TITLE46/46-4/46-4-6.6.HTM. 
42
  Id. 
43
 Dennis W. Nixon, Evolution of Public and Private Rights to Rhode Island’s Shore, 24 Suffolk. U. L. Rev. 313, 
321 (1999). 
44
See The Public Trust Doctrine, Striking a Balance Between Public and Private Rights in the Shore, pg. 12.  (June 
4, 1999, Roger Williams University Ralph R. Papitto School of Law, Bristol, RI) (“A state may still delegate to local 
governments the responsibility and authority for administering Trust resources.  Such delegations may take the form 
of local shoreland zoning, and port and harbor management.”). See also Champlain‟s Reality Assoc. v. Tillson, 2001 
WL 770810,  at *5 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2001). 
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compatibility with the Coastal Resources Management Program (a.k.a. the “Red Book”). 45  
CRMC has emphasized this by expressing that the harbor cities‟ power is limited by the agency‟s 
approval of the location of the proposed mooring permitting areas.
46
  The plan approval program 
was developed to facilitate the positive interaction of municipalities with the CRMC: “[w]hile 
the primary responsibility for developing and implementing harbor management remains at the 
local level, regulations to ensure that actions taken by the municipalities are consistent with the 
overriding management programs are reserved by the state.”47  The CRMC‟s April 2010 
approval of the City of Newport‟s Comprehensive Harbor Management Plan (Harbor Plan) 
indicates that Newport‟s mooring scheme is in compliance with CRMC‟s regulations and 
consistent with its purposes. 
When permittees seek approval for projects that involve both moorings and CRMC-
regulated elements, CRMC retains jurisdiction over the entire project and Newport loses 
authority over those moorings.
48
  For example, an operation that includes moorings plus docks, 
floats, and/or a floating business would be outside of Newport‟s jurisdiction.49  If the permits for 
the elements under exclusive CRMC jurisdiction were denied, however, Newport would resume 
jurisdiction over the remaining moorings.
50
  Due to these intersections with CRMC jurisdiction, 
Newport has exclusive jurisdiction over moorings only under two conditions: (1) it is acting 
pursuant to a CRMC-approved Harbor Plan, and (2) the applicant seeks a mooring only.   
In order to best exercise the power to issue mooring permits, the Newport City Council 
has created the Commission, which serves to “recommend areas to be designated for anchorages 
and moorings, as well as suggested rules and regulations governing the placement and 
administration of assigned moorings.”51  The Newport City Council considers the Commission‟s 
recommendations in enacting Harbor Rules and Regulations by city ordinance.
52
   
                                                          
45
 Coastal Resources Management Council, Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Program § 300.15 
(December, 2010), available at http://www.crmc.ri.gov/regulations/RICRMP.pdf (The Red Book). 
46
 Coastal Resources Management Council, Management Procedures for Siting Mooring Areas, pg. 1 (May 20, 
2006), available at http://www.crmc.ri.gov/regulations/Mooring_Fields_Siting.pdf. 
47
 R.I. Admin. Code 16-1-13-B (West 2010).   
48
 Miner v. Newport, 1988 WL 1017203, *3 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1988) (a.k.a. Bolender case). 
49
 Id.  
50
 See Miner, Id. at 5 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1988). 
51
 Newport Code of Ordinances 2.88.030(D), available at 
http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=16524&stateId=39&stateName=Rhode Island.  
52
 Id. at 12.28.130. 
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Therefore, Newport generally enjoys autonomy from the federal government in its harbor 
management responsibilities, but remains subject to CRMC‟s oversight of the Newport‟s Harbor 
Management Plan.  While the General Assembly specifically delegated Newport the power to 
regulate moorings, this authority is subject to the statutory requirement of PTD compatibility.  
Newport‟s administration of its mooring scheme is also guided by Illinois Central, the United 
State Supreme Court‟s articulation of the minimum requirements for public trust administrators.  
Under Illinois Central, Newport may issue mooring permits only if it retains regulatory control 
and determines that the permits either advance a public trust interest or have a minimal negative 
impact on the general public‟s right to use public trust waters.53 
Note: Federal Role 
While Newport and CRMC share significant regulatory authority over moorings, there 
are several federal restrictions on that authority.  First, because mooring equipment are 
permanent “structures” in navigable water under the Rivers and Harbors Act54, the state must act 
pursuant to its General Permit from the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Army Corps).
55
    
Second, moorings that are within “federal project areas”56 may be subject to Army Corps‟ 
guidance policies.  However, Newport is seeking to redefine the boundaries of the federal project 
areas.
57
   
Third, state and local regulatory power is subject to the federal navigational servitude.  
The navigational servitude is defined as "an aspect of the sovereignty of the United States, 
grounded in the power of the Federal Government to regulate commerce, entitling the 
government to exert a dominant servitude in all lands below the ordinary high water mark of 
                                                          
53
 See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892), available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/146/387/.    
54
 33 C.F.R. § 322.3(a) (West 2011) (“DA permits are required under section 10 for structures and/or work in or 
affecting navigable waters of the United States”), available at http://law.justia.com/cfr/title33/33-
3.0.1.1.28.0.10.3.html; 33 C.F.R. § 322.2(b) (West 2011), available at http://cfr.vlex.com/vid/322-2-definitions-
19766543 (The term structure shall include, without limitation, any pier, boat dock, boat ramp, wharf, dolphin, weir, 
boom, breakwater, bulkhead, revetment, riprap, jetty, artificial island, artificial reef, permanent mooring structure, 
power transmission line, permanently moored floating vessel, piling, aid to navigation, or any other obstacle or 
obstruction).  These regulations are enacted pursuant to the Army Corps‟ authority to promulgate 33 U.S.C.A. § 403, 
available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/33/403.html. 
55
 Department of the Army, Programmatic General Permit, State of Rhode Island, General Permit No. NAE-2006-
2711 (February 13, 2007), available at http://www.nae.usace.army.mil/reg/Permits/RI_PGP.pdf. 
56
 Map No. 3 in the Newport Waterfront Commission, City of Newport Comprehensive Harbor Management Plan 
(April 2010).   
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navigable streams.”58  This means the federal government has a paramount interest in protecting 
interstate travel and business.  If commerce is being impaired in state waters, the federal 
government will override the usual policy of giving local authorities autonomy over harbor 
management and step in to protect commerce.  The superior power vested in the navigational 
servitude gives the federal government authority to make laws pre-empting any interfering state 
or local regulation.  The United States Supreme Court may also overrule any state court decision 
deemed inconsistent with the federal navigational servitude.  While the Harbor Plan does 
indicate that the moorings may have some effect on navigation, this issue is beyond the scope of 
this report.
59
   
Finally, parts of Newport Harbor are currently designated federal “anchorage grounds”60 
and federal “special anchorage areas.”61  These areas are subject to Coast Guard regulations 
unrelated to the mooring issues discussed in this report.
62
 
III. Statutory Compliance of Newport’s Mooring Regulations 
 
In administering its mooring regulations, Newport is subject to both federal and state 
statutes.  The Rivers and Harbors Act applies to Newport‟s moorings through its grant of 
authority to Army Corps to issue General Permits to harbor municipalities.  Under Rhode Island 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
57
 Newport Waterfront Commission, City of Newport Comprehensive Harbor Management Plan, pg. 101 (April 
2010). 
58
 78 Am. Jur. 2d Waters §137 (West 2010). 
59
 For example, the issue of moorings experiencing vessel drifting over the federal navigation channel is mentioned 
on page 102 of the Harbor Management Plan. 
60
 Federal Anchorage D is located west of Goat Island and lying between Rose Island to its north and Ft. Adams to 
its south.  Newport Waterfront Commission, City of Newport Comprehensive Harbor Management Plan, pg. 101 
(April 2010).  Federal Anchorage E is located north of the Point Mooring Area going north to the southerly shore of 
Coasters Harbor Island.  HMP pg. 105.  The official coordinate descriptions are set forth at 33 C.F.R. § 110.145, 
available at http://cfr.vlex.com/vid/110-145-narragansett-bay-19758708. 
61
 Area No.1 is in Brenton Cove.  Area No. 2 is east of Goat Island.  Area No. 3 is north of the Goat Island 
Causeway Bridge beginning at the Newport Harbor Light following the southerly boundary of Anchorage E to the 
shoreline, south along the shoreline to the east foot of the Goat Island Causeway Bridge, west following the Goat 
Island Causeway Bridge to the shoreline of Goat Island, north following the east shore of Goat Island to the point of 
beginning.  33 C.F.R. § 110.46 (West 2011), available at http://cfr.vlex.com/vid/110-46-newport-harbor-19758249. 
62
 For the Coast Guard regulations regarding boat traffic in anchorage grounds, see 33 C.F.R. § 109.05, available at 
http://cfr.vlex.com/vid/109-05-anchorage-grounds-19757933.  For the Coast Guard regulations regarding boat traffic 
in these special anchorage areas, see 33 C.F.R. § 109.10, available at http://cfr.vlex.com/vid/109-10-special-
anchorage-areas-19757949. 
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law, municipalities must also meet the PTD compatibility requirement explained in subsection B, 
below. 
A. Compliance with Rhode Island’s Army Corps General Permit 
Federal law requires a permit from the Army Corps to place any physical structure, 
including mooring tackle, in navigable waters.
63
  Rhode Island municipalities have Army Corps‟ 
permission to allow private parties to place mooring equipment within their jurisdiction, subject 
to the conditions provided in Rhode Island General Permit.
64
  The Permit expressly allows 
“private, non-commercial, non-rental, single-boat moorings” that are cited pursuant to a CRMC-
approved Harbor Plan.
 65
  The general permit requires Army Corps approval for any moorings 
that do meet that description.
 66
    
Unless the area is de-authorized, it may be advisable to recognize Army Corps 
jurisdiction in Newport‟s ordinance.  This could be accomplished by indicating that Newport‟s 
commercial mooring permits are subject to Army Corps approval.  Sample language can be 
found in Jamestown‟s ordinance: “New applicants for commercial mooring permits in harbor 
waters must be approved by the [CRMC], the Army Corps of Engineers, and the harbor 
commission.”67   
B. The PTD Compatibility Requirement 
As discussed in Section II, the 2000 General Assembly set forth two different standards 
for state disposition and leasing of public trust resources.  R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-5-1.2 has two 
important provisions: 
                                                          
63
 33 C.F.R. § 322.2(b) (West 2011), available at http://cfr.vlex.com/vid/322-2-definitions-19766543. 
64
 Department of the Army, Programmatic General Permit, State of Rhode Island, General Permit No. NAE-2006-
2711 (February 13, 2007), available at http://www.nae.usace.army.mil/reg/Permits/RI_PGP.pdf. 
65
 Id.  See also, Maine Harbormasters Association, Harbor Management, A Legal Guide for Harbormasters and 
Coastal Officials, available at http://www.maineharbormasters.org/Harbor%20Management.htm  (Maine‟s general 
permit has the same restriction, leading the MHA report to conclude: “rental moorings are not included under the 
permit.  As a result, marina operators and others who plan to lease moorings must obtain a permit from the Corps.”)  
66
 Department of the Army, Programmatic General Permit, State of Rhode Island, General Permit No. NAE-2006-
2711 (February 13, 2007), available at http://www.nae.usace.army.mil/reg/Permits/RI_PGP.pdf.   
67
 Jamestown Code of Ordinances, Ch. 78, Art. II, Div. 4, Sec. 6(e), available at 
http://www.jamestownri.net/harbor/HMO/Harbor_Ordinance_2004.pdf. 
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(a) Before absolute title to public trust waters may be transferred to private parties, the 
General Assembly must first make a PTD compatibility determination.
68
   
(b) When a more limited property interest is involved (i.e. a lease), the statute still requires a 
PTD compatibility determination, but provides that the duty to make the determination 
may be delegated to another government entity.
69
     
The first standard requires a PTD compatibility determination by the General Assembly itself.  
The General Assembly has made a PTD compatibility determination for “recreational mooring 
areas.”70  The General Assembly left CRMC the responsibility of further defining approved 
“recreational moorings.”71  CRMC in turn defined “recreational moorings areas” as “any 
designated area managed by a commercial enterprise, a club, a city, or town, where five (5) or 
more recreational craft are kept at moorings.”72  Newport‟s private mooring areas fall within the 
category definition as moorings managed by a city.  The city‟s commercial moorings also appear 
to meet the scope of the legislative consistency determination as moorings “managed by a 
commercial enterprise,” but remain subject to the Newport‟s regulatory authority.   
Under the second provision, applicable to leases, the PTD compatibility determination 
may be made by either the legislature or by the appropriate government delegate.  However, the 
General Assembly has not addressed whether CRMC or Newport is the delegate in this situation.  
While it is clear that CRMC is generally the agency to which the administration of public trust 
waters has been designated,
73
 administration of moorings in particular has been delegated to 
Newport.
74
  It is unclear whether (a) the delegation of mooring authority also delegates the PTD 
compatibility determination to Newport, or (b) CRMC‟s more general public trust delegation 
controls.   
Under the former interpretation, Newport has the responsibility of deciding whether the 
mooring scheme is consistent with the PTD.  This decision would be informed by Illinois 
Central.  The analysis of the mooring scheme under the principles of Illinois Central is explored 
                                                          
68
 R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-5-1.2(a), available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/TITLE46/46-5/46-5-1.2.HTM. 
69
 R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-5-1.2(b), available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/TITLE46/46-5/46-5-1.2.HTM. 
70
 R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-23-6, available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/Title46/46-23/46-23-6.HTM 
71
 Id. 
72
 Coastal Resources Management Council, Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Program § 300.4 
(December, 2010), available at http://www.crmc.ri.gov/regulations/RICRMP.pdf (The Red Book). 
73
 R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-23-6, , available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/Title46/46-23/46-23-6.HTM 
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in section IV of this report.  The latter interpretation may be more consistent with CRMC‟s 
views.  The CRMC‟s has articulated its position that municipalities empowered by statute to 
regulate moorings are not “specifically empowered to consider environmental impacts of 
activists, prevention of conflicts with other water dependent uses, or to decide resource 
allocation questions” (emphasis supplied).75  Because a PTD compatibility determination 
requires balancing the benefit of moorings with other public use interests, it might be construed 
as a “resource allocation question” outside Newport‟s scope of authority. 
There are two indications that CRMC has made or would make the requisite 
compatibility determination with regard to Newport‟s private and commercial moorings.  When 
CRMC defined “recreational mooring area” for purposes of delineating the scope of the 
legislature‟s categorical PTD compatibility determination, it specifically contemplated moorings 
managed by the city (private moorings) and those managed by a commercial enterprise 
(commercial moorings).  CRMC‟s approval of Newport‟s HMP may also be construed as a 
manifestation of CRMC‟s views on the PTD compatibility issue.  Assuming that the CRMC 
acted pursuant to its “role of public trustee for the state‟s coastal resources,”76 the agency would 
not have approved any provisions of the HMP that the agency deemed inconsistent with the 
PTD.    
IV.     Public Trust Doctrine Applied to Newport’s Mooring Regulations 
The application of the PTD to Newport‟s mooring scheme includes two important 
inquires under Illinois Central: (A) the nature of the interest conveyed to the mooring holder and 
the nature of the regulatory power retained by the city, and (B) whether the private moorings are 
in the public interest or have a minimalistic effect on that interest, discussed in turn below in 
subsections A and B, respectively. 
A. The Nature of the Property Interest Conveyed by a Mooring Permit 
In examining the nature of the property interest conveyed by a Newport mooring permit, 
this section provides three ways to assess property rights.  The first inquiry is the conveyance of 
the right to exclude others.  The public trust significance of this inquiry is the degree to which 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
74
 R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-4-6.6, available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/TITLE46/46-4/46-4-6.6.HTM. 
75
 R.I. Admin. Code 16-1-13-B (West 2010). 
76
 Dennis W. Nixon, Evolution of Public and Private Rights to Rhode Island’s Shore, 24 Suffolk. U. L. Rev. 313, 
321 (1999). 
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moorings interfere with non-permittees‟ use and enjoyment of public trust waters.  The second 
question centers around the revocability of the property interest.  The final aspect of the property 
interest analysis is the issue of mooring alienability (i.e. the right to dispose of the property right 
by sale or deed).  The public trust significance of the latter two inquiries depends on the inverse 
relationship between the scope of the property interest conveyed and the scope of the 
management authority the City retained. 
Before this analysis, it is important to note the distinctions between commercial moorings 
and private moorings under Newport‟s ordinances.  These differences inform the characterization 
of the property interests involved.  Private moorings are designated for use by the boat registered 
to that mooring.
77
  Commercial moorings are defined in the Newport mooring ordinance as “any 
mooring which does not meet the definition of a private mooring.”78 
The most significant difference between private and commercial moorings is that 
commercial moorings may be rented to third parties.  In fact, that is their primary purpose.  In 
contrast, the private mooring lessee is strictly forbidden from subleasing the mooring space.
79
  In 
fact, an attempt to do so will result in forfeiture of the license.
80
  Newport‟s policy is to place 
heavy restrictions on use by vessels not registered to the mooring in order to ensure that the 
private moorings are not being unlawfully used in a commercial manner for rental profit.  
Therefore, while the private lessee may allow another vessel to occupy the mooring space for up 
to 7 days at a time not exceeding 14 total days per year, such use must be (a) approved by the 
harbormaster in writing, and (b) not be compensated, i.e. not produce profit for the mooring 
holder.
81
  The other circumstance in which a non-registered boat could occupy the mooring space 
is by rafting.
82
  The limitations on the use of rafting in the Newport ordinances is that (a) it shall 
“not interfere with adjacent single moorings or anchorages,” (b) the rafted boat needs to be 
manned at all times,
83
 and (c) the lessee cannot receive compensation from the rafted boat.
84
  
                                                          
77
 Newport Code of Ordinances 12.28.130(C)(2)(g); 12.28.130(D)(3), available at 
http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=16524&stateId=39&stateName=Rhode Island.  
78
 Id. at 12.28.130(B)(8).  
79
 Id. at 12.28.130(F)(4).  
80
 Id.   
81
 Id. at 12.28.130(F)(4) and 12.28.130(D)(3).  
82
 Id. at 12.28.130(M). 
83
 Id. 
84
 Id. at 12.28.130(D)(3).  
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With regard to commercial moorings, however, Newport retains relatively less regulatory 
control.   
1. Right to Exclude 
The right to exclude others has been described as the most important right in the bundle 
of property rights.
85
  Newport‟s mooring permits give the permittee the right and perhaps even 
the responsibility to exclude other boats from using the mooring space registered to them.  
Because this results in the exclusion of the general public from mooring areas, the property 
interest in exclusion directly relates to the Illinois Central inquiry into the degree that the 
property interest conveyed interferes with the general public‟s use and enjoyment of public trust 
waters.  That question is explored further in subsection B below. 
2. License Revocability 
Mooring permits are subject to regulatory conditions that warrant revocation.  These include 
aspects of the Newport mooring ordinance such as a valid Rhode Island boat registration, 
mooring tackle specifications, boat size limits, and the registration sticker system.  Because the 
mooring license is revocable if the licensee fails to comply with any of these conditions, the right 
to use and possess the mooring space is not absolute.  In this respect, the mooring permits more 
closely resemble a preferred right to access the water than a vested property interest.  CRMC 
explicitly recognized the license nature of all mooring permits, clarifying that any activities 
carried out pursuant to approved Harbor Management Plans “shall be considered to be acting 
under license from the State of Rhode Island.” 86   
A revocable license is in stark contrast to the conveyance condemned in Illinois Central.
87
 
That case involved a transfer of absolute title in fee simple to a private party.  In contrast, 
Newport‟s mooring scheme conveys a revocable license.  The United States Supreme Court has 
made this distinction between impermissible fee simple transfers and the permissible revocable 
licenses in the dock permit context.
88
   
                                                          
85
 63C Am. Jur. 2d Property § 1 (West 2011) (The right to exclude others, as well as their property, is one of the 
most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.) 
86
 R.I. Admin. Code 16-1-13-B (West 2010). 
87
 See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892), available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/146/387/.   
88
 Id.     
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The public trust significance of limiting the scope of a licensee‟s property interest arises 
from the relationship between rights conveyed and management responsibilities retained.  This 
retention of management responsibility is a key requirement under Illinois Central.  Private 
moorings are more consistent with Illinois Central due to the additional regulatory restrictions on 
the use of the mooring by unregistered boats.  In this respect, Newport retains more control over 
private moorings than over commercial mooring.  Therefore, private moorings, having more 
restrictions, receive a more circumscribed property interest than do commercial moorings. 
In addition to limiting the scope of the property interest for public trust purposes, 
revocability has legal significance under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
89
 as 
incorporated against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.
90
  The Takings Clause requires 
the state to compensate a private property interest holder if the state either takes away, physically 
intrudes on, or enacts regulations render the property interest economically valueless.
91
  But with 
regard to Newport‟s mooring, a licensee is put on notice that his or her license is revocable.  
Thus, if a private or commercial license is revoked, the City does not have to compensate the 
permit holder, because the permittee never had a reasonable expectation of continued use in the 
first place.  The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has explained that “permits to perform 
activities on public land…are mere licenses whose revocation cannot rise to the level of a 5th 
amendment taking.” 92  This conclusion would apply with equal force to licenses to use public 
trust water. 
3. Alienability 
Alienability of a property interest refers to the right to dispose, which means the ability of 
the owner to sell or deed the property interest.
93
  In Newport, the right to dispose of private 
moorings is limited to a transfer to a family member.
94
  In the case of moorings registered to a 
                                                          
89
 U.S. Const. amend. V, available at http://topics.law.cornell.edu/constitution/billofrights#amendmentv 
90
 See, e.g. Missouri v. Nebraska, 196 U.S. 23 (1904), available at 
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=196&invol=23.  
91
 See, e.g. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/91-453.ZS.html. 
92
 Marine One v. Manatee County, 898 F.2d 1490, 1492-1493 (11
th
 Circ. 1990), available at 
http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/898/898.F2d.1490.87-3656.html. 
93
 See 63C Am. Jur. 2d Property § 35 (West 2011) (“One of the principal and most important rights incident to 
ownership is alienability, or the right to disposition.”) 
94
Newport Code of Ordinances 12.28.130(D)(2), available at 
http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=16524&stateId=39&stateName=Rhode Island.  As of the date of 
this report, the Newport ordinance did not limit the number of transfers between family members.  One of the goals 
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natural person, this limitation is easily enforced.  With respect to private moorings registered to 
partnerships, LLCs, or corporations, however, application of the transfer limit provision is less 
straight-forward.  Under a strict interpretation, business entities may never transfer private 
moorings because they do not have any family members.  While the partners, members, or 
shareholders no doubt have family members, the business entity is recognized as a legally 
separate property owner.
95
  This means that the property of the business entity, the mooring 
permit in this case, is not the property of the natural persons that belong to that business 
organization.  This strict construction is consistent with business organization law, which 
punishes natural person representatives who disregard business formality by treating business 
assets as their own.
96
   
With regard to commercial moorings, the ordinances do not explicitly prohibit 
transferring the mooring by deed or sale.  While the ordinance‟s intent to allow renting out 
commercial moorings is clear, the ordinance thus leaves the question of alienability unanswered.  
Furthermore, because of the concept of separate legal identity, both private and 
commercial moorings held by business associations may change natural person ownership 
without any “transfer” action.  Because LLCs and corporations can change ownership hands 
without any alteration to its business identity,
97
  one interpretation of the ordinance is that 
moorings could be transferred between private parties into perpetuity.  
The public trust significance of alienability is that it results in transfer of a much broader 
property interest.  As noted in subsection 2, the broader the property interest conveyed, the less 
regulatory authority the City of Newport has retained.  Therefore, commercial moorings, without 
further limits introduced into the ordinance revision, are less consistent with the principles of 
Illinois Central.    
Ordinance Recommendation: Clarifying the Property Interest Conveyed 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of ordinance review is to revise the ordinance to comply with CRMC guidelines stipulating only one transfer.  
Personal Communication with Hank Kniskern (E-mail received April 27
th
, 2010). 
95
 See, generally, NTS Am. Jur. 2d Limited Liability Companies § 1 (West 2011), 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership § 
246 (West 2011), 18 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 44(West 2011). 
96
 18 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 46 (West 2011). 
97
See Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206, 216 (1908), citing Donnell v. 
Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co. 208 U. S. 267, 273 (1908)  (“ a corporation remains unchanged and unaffected in its 
identity by changes in its members”).  These cases are available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/210/206/ and 
http://supreme.justia.com/us/208/267/case.html, respectively. 
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Like any property license, Newport‟s mooring permits “can be revoked at the pleasure of 
the licensor, regardless of how long the use has been permitted.”98  Because mooring permits are 
often renewed across a long period of time, it may be beneficial to highlight the notion of 
revocability despite the length of time one holds a permit.  While permittees do not have an 
absolute legal right of ownership, the length of time one holds a permit does increase the 
permittee‟s expectation that the right will not be forfeited.  The tension created by such 
expectations might be eased by further clarification in the ordinance or within the documents 
issued to mooring applicants and permittees.  
Thus, it may be beneficial to add a clarification that the mooring permit does not (a) carry 
absolute property rights, (b) provide for a term longer than one year, and (c) is revocable if the 
harbormaster reasonably finds a violation.  In Maine, for example, “recent amendments clarify 
that a grant of the privilege to set a mooring does not carry with it any property rights to state 
owned submerged lands occupied by the mooring.”99  The Maine Harbormasters Association‟s 
Harbor Management Guide explains that the amendments “should bar claims that the state has in 
any way conveyed away public trust lands.”100  This could also bar claims against the city for 
any damages related to a forfeiture decision based on takings claims explained in section 
IV(A)(2) of this report. 
Newport may also benefit from adopting the Massachusetts term “temporary mooring,” 
which is used in the state‟s legislation to describe its mooring permits, defining temporary as “no 
longer than to the end of any given calendar year.”101  This phraseology emphasizes the fact that 
the mooring permit holder does not have any vested property interest in the mooring beyond one 
year.  
B. Compatibility of Moorings with the Public’s Interest 
The second issue arising under Illinois Central is whether the moorings are consistent 
with the purposes of the PTD.  The PTD is satisfied if the property interest transferred (a) is in 
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 53 C.J.S. Licenses § 43 (West 2010). 
99
 Maine Harbormasters Association, Harbor Management, A Legal Guide for Harbormasters and Coastal Officials, 
available at http://www.maineharbormasters.org/Harbor%20Management.htm (discussing 38 M.R.S.A. § 3, 
available at http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/statutes/38/title38sec3.html). 
100
 Id. 
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 M.G.L.A. 91 § 10A (West 2011), available at 
http://www.malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/PartI/TitleXIV/Chapter91/Section10A. 
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furtherance of the public interest, or (b) has a minimal impact on the public‟s use of the 
resource.
102
  But which government unit decides this?  Because Illinois Central does not answer 
the question, the matter is left entirely to state law.   
Under the statute codifying the public trust doctrine in Rhode Island, the General 
Assembly must make the decision about whether an absolute ownership interest may be 
transferred to a private party.
103
  Some other states have also vested their legislative branches 
with the power and duty to administer public trust waters.
104
  On the other hand, some states 
have deemed it poor policy to leave the PTD in the hands of the legislature.  One court went so 
far as to conclude: “[w]e find the concept of stewardship inconsistent with the function of the 
Legislature.”105  The concern is that legislatures act too broadly by declaring that an entire 
category of uses is consistent with the public trust doctrine, without regard to the important local 
variables.  While legislative sessions focus on general policies, case-by-case adjudication looks 
at the facts underlying the particular property interest and its impact on public trust uses.  The 
degree of impact of permitted activities on public trust uses varies based on the time, place, and 
the manner of those existing and proposed uses.   
Under Rhode Island‟s public trust law, either the legislative branch or the relevant 
delegate determines whether a transfer of a limited property interest (i.e. a license) is consistent 
with the PTD.  As explained in Section III in this report, there is a question as to whether the 
relevant delegate for mooring PTD compatibility determinations is CRMC or the Commission.  
Some states have delegated public trust administration to administrative agencies
106
 like CRMC, 
while other states have delegated the responsibility to local government units,
107
 like the 
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 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892), available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/146/387/.   
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 R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-5-1.2(a), available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/TITLE46/46-5/46-5-1.2.HTM. 
104
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 Louisiana Seafood Management Council v. Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries Com'n, 719 So.2d 119 (La. App. 
1998), available at 
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Commission.  Without deciding where the delegation lies in Rhode Island, the information in this 
section is intended to inform the Commission‟s own consideration of PTD compatibility. 
1. In Furtherance of the “Public Interest”? 
The “public interest” language used in Illinois Central is different from the usual 
pronouncement that the state holds title in trust for the “public use.”  However, the Supreme 
Court did not further explain what it meant by “public interest.”  One interpretation is that it is a 
restatement of the purpose of the trust for preserving traditional public uses.  The other 
interpretation depends on a broader understanding of the public‟s interests, which extends 
beyond actual use of public trust waters. 
a. Traditional Public Trust Uses 
The PTD traditionally protects navigation, commerce, and fishing.
108
  It is clear that the 
PTD is violated if a property interest transferred to a private party results in substantial 
interference with the general public‟s ability to use the resource for those purposes.  But it is not 
clear from Illinois Central the degree to which any transfer should go beyond non-interference 
and actually further the public‟s use of the area.   
Moorings enhance enjoyment for certain boat-owners.  Moorings allow permittees to 
access the water more conveniently than access by public boat ramp.  Some permittees use the 
moored vessel for recreational fishing.  The commercial moorings are a source of revenue for 
commercial lessees.  For non-permittees, however, moorings do not further actual use for the 
general public.  Neither do Newport moorings further the additional Rhode Island Constitution 
guarantees of gathering of seaweed, leaving the shore to swim in the area, and passage along the 
shore.
109
  However, none of these benefits to traditional public trust uses are shared by the public 
as a whole.   
It is uncertain under the PTD whether the mooring system is benefiting enough of the 
general public to be considered as promoting public trust uses.  However, any project designed 
for the general public will necessarily exclude some people at the same time.  For example, a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
“public trust” duties provided that the delegation is in furtherance of the trust and will not block the advancement of 
paramount interests”), available at 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2705054096608551323&q=271+N.W.2d+69+&hl=en&as_sdt=2,40. 
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 See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894), available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/152/1/case.html. 
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public beach will accommodate visitors from the general public, but the number could be limited 
in order to provide for a safe visitor-to-lifeguard ratio without offending the PTD.  The Supreme 
Court of California provided another example when it upheld one municipality‟s decision lease 
tidal areas to a packing, processing, and shipping warehouse, calling it a “public use in 
furtherance of the trust for navigation and commerce.”110  The fact that the plant would not 
accommodate every member of the public did not prevent a finding that it provided for overall 
promotion of traditional public trust uses.   
Furthermore, while the mooring scheme inevitably enhances the use of certain members 
of the public to the exclusion of others, the alternative of unregulated moorings is unworkable.  
Allowing unrestricted mooring would greatly hinder safety and navigation throughout the harbor 
to the detriment of not some, but all, members of the public.  While the system is, like any 
regulatory scheme, not perfect, Newport strives to reach an equitable balance between the need 
to limit use and the desire to expand use to more of the general public by using an open public 
allocation process.  The extent to which private use of mooring space to select private parties 
reduces the area of the harbor usable by general public is discussed in subsection 2 below.   
b. Broader Public Interest Test 
The inquiry into the more general public interest of moorings considers benefits outside 
of the traditional public trust purposes.  The United States Supreme Court stated that, in addition 
to the promotion of interstate and international commerce, a state could transfer interests in 
public trust areas for the purpose of performing international obligations or for “other public 
purposes.”111  For example, benefits to the public might include “increasing tax revenues” or 
“[putting] property to a commercial use.”112   
The question of whether the mooring scheme puts public property into private hands for a 
broader “public use” may be informed by cases dealing with the “public use” test in a different 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
109
 R.I. Const. art. I, § 17 (West 2011), available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/RiConstitution/C01.html. 
110
 Atwood v. Hammond, 48 P.2d 20, 24-25 (Cal. 1935), available at 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1377038613279570502&q=48+P.2d+20&hl=en&as_sdt=2,40. 
111
 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48 (1894), available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/152/1/case.html. 
112
 Natl. Audubon Soc‟y v. Sup. Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1983), available at 
http://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/national-audubon-society-v-superior-court-30644. 
22 
 
legal context.  For example, in an eminent domain context,
113
 the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
explained that there are two categories of appropriate “public uses”: (1) “where the public use is 
direct and obvious,” and (2) where “the public necessity is so direct and obvious as to imply a 
public use.”114  
The first category satisfying the public interest includes uses such as highways, parks, 
drainage systems, which the public directly uses.  In evaluating public interest of a marina and 
auditorium operation by the Newport Development Authority, the Supreme Court of Rhode 
Island responded that the facility could not be leased “to private persons to be operated for 
private purposes and profit.” 115  But the court construed the auditorium as satisfying public 
purpose, with the limitation that it “must be devoted primarily to a use by or service to the public 
and not to any private use, unless the latter be merely incidental and reasonably related to the 
proper public use and be productive of revenue for the public.”116  While the court thus 
recognized that a private use may benefit the public by production of tax revenue, it required that 
the private use be incidental.  Thus, while the mooring revenues are dedicated to harbor 
development projects that do benefit the entire public, the wholly private use by mooring 
permittees is more than incidental under this test.
117
  
While raising revenue through tourism benefits Newport‟s residents, it is not enough 
under a strict public use test.  However, Newport‟s mooring scheme may be distinguished from a 
general revenue raising scheme.  The use of the Maritime Enterprise Fund (MEP) ensures that 
the revenues are expended for specific harbor purposes, including projects that greatly improve 
the general public‟s use of the harbor.  The benefits of the MEP are explored further in section 
VIII of this report. 
The “public necessity” category covers uses such as repair and storage facilities that are 
necessary for the continuance of an established public use such as a railroad.  The relevant 
question is whether moorings are reasonably necessary to facilitate recreational boating.  If so, 
                                                          
113
 “Eminent Domain”  is defined as “The inherent power of a governmental entity to take   privately owned 
property, esp. land, and convert it to public use, subject to reasonable compensation for the taking.  Black‟s Law 
Dictionary (9
th
 ed. 2009)(emphasis supplied). 
114
 In re Rhode Island Suburban RY. Co., 48 A.591, 592 (R.I. 1901). 
115
 Opinion to the Governor, 70 A.2d 817, 76 R.I. 365, 372 (R.I. 1950). 
116
 Id. at 373. 
117
 See also People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d 773, 781 (Ill. 1976)(the public purpose cannot be 
“too indirect, intangible and elusive to satisfy the requirement of a public purpose”). 
23 
 
the mooring scheme is consistent with other jurisdictions‟ use of the PTD to facilitate 
recreational use of water resources.
118
  The Rhode Island Supreme Court explained that uses 
falling outside these two categories are not “public uses.”  The court explained that “there are 
many kinds of business of great benefit to the public” that are not for the “public use.”119   
While the moorings do not fall neatly within the “public use” categories or clearly 
without it, the inquiry is not a static one.  It is important to remember the ever-changing nature of 
the public use inquiry.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court does not give public use a “rigid, 
unbending, absolute definition,” instead highlighting the “ever-changing conditions of our 
modern society, new advances in the fields of science, new concepts in the scope and function of 
government and other circumstances.”120  An interest in developing the tourism industry has 
been recognized by at least some courts.  The Supreme Court of Mississippi, for example, held 
that allowing a development that would benefit commerce and tourism was “consistent with the 
public trust,” stating the private ownership aspect of the development alone did “not negative the 
comprehensive public purpose.”121 
In summary, the following facts bear most directly on the public use and interest inquiry.  
Newport‟s mooring scheme facilitates public trust uses for permittees.  The system necessarily 
limits the number of individuals who can enjoy the use-facilitating permits, but does so by an 
open public allocation process.  Non-permittees benefit from the mooring scheme only insomuch 
as the fees are used for harbor projects, the use of which may be enjoyed by a greater segment of 
the general public.   
2. Minimal Impact on the Public’s Use? 
Another inquiry under Illinois Central is whether the conveyance is so minimal as to not 
constitute any interference with the public‟s use.122  Some jurisdictions have focused this inquiry 
on the percentage of the resource that is being allocated to private parties.  For example, while 
the Supreme Court of California held that 40% of public trust waters could not be granted to 
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private parties,
123
 a California appellate court found that a grant of 1.6% constituted a “relatively 
small parcel.”124  Similarly, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin considered the fact that “the 
diminution of [the public trust area] will be very small when compared with the whole of [the 
public trust area].”125   
In Newport, the permitted moorings are located in designated areas that total 245 acres.
126
  
The ordinance provides that 25% of mooring permits may be issued as commercial moorings.  
Correlated to the area, it is useful to think of the commercial mooring as occupying around 60 
acres of the Harbor, closing off those 60 acres from public and recreational use.  Of course, the 
relationship between the number of mooring permits and the occupied mooring area is direct, but 
not proportional.  It might be useful to contrast this number with the larger area (1000 acres) 
stuck down as violating of the public trust doctrine by the US Supreme Court in Illinois 
Central
127
 and the area of the “relatively small parcel[s]” upheld by the California Supreme Court 
(18 acres in one case
128
; 10.6 in another
129
).    
Another way of approaching the issue is to look at the percentage being granted as proxy 
for impairment of the public‟s use of the resource.  In other words, some courts look at the 
percentage in order to aid the ultimate determination of whether the conveyance has impaired the 
public‟s enjoyment of the public trust resource.  For example, in evaluating the “impediment to 
full use of the public trust resource,” the Supreme Court of Idaho looks at the portion of the 
water body “taken up by docks, moorings or other impediments.”  This fact-based inquiry is 
resolved if “no one of the public uses of [the public trust resource] will be destroyed or greatly 
impaired.
130
  The survey of Newport Harbor consumers contained in the HMP contains many 
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comments on Newport‟s moorings.  However, none refer to any interference with fishing, 
navigation, or any of the other Rhode Island Constitution uses.
131
   
V.     Private: Commercial Mooring Ratio 
CRMC has recognized the need to “balance between commercial and non-commercial 
uses” in designating moorings.132  Newport has decided to set its balance between private and 
commercial moorings at a ratio of 3:1.
133
  This restricts the number of commercial moorings to 
no more than 25% of the total leased moorings.
134
    
Despite the 25% limit provided in the ordinance, 32% of the total moorings in Newport 
are currently registered as commercial.
135
  This figure does not include any private moorings that 
are being misused as rental moorings, but Newport has made prevention of such use a priority 
for the harbor.
136
  The harbormaster works to enjoin licensees of private moorings from 
unlawfully sub-leasing.  This protects Newport from being deprived of increased fee revenue and 
from distortion of the ordinance‟s commercial/private ratio.   
The current ordinance also has a provision that allows private mooring lessees to apply 
for re-designation as a commercial mooring.
137
  Newport should consider how this will alter the 
ratio.  For example, it might be prudent to add a clarification in the ordinance that such 
application can be made only at such time as the commercial mooring percentage is reduced 
below 25%.  The ordinance is silent as to prioritizing between persons on the new commercial 
mooring waiting list and those on the re-designation list.  Newport may wish to consider 
addressing, through the ordinance, the preference, if any, to those who seek re-designation or 
clarifying that all applicants for commercial mooring permits, irrespective of previous or current 
licensee status, are placed in a common pool.   
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Decisions about allocating between new and re-designation applicants raise a host of 
other policy considerations, any extended discussion of which is beyond the scope of this report.  
On one hand, giving priority to transferees would allow an additional recreational user to obtain 
a mooring.  On the other hand, the priority gives fuels any false sense that the existing mooring 
holder is “entitled” to benefits beyond the one year term of his or her residential license.   
In summary, Newport, in balancing between commercial and private interests, has tipped 
the scale at 3:1 in favor of private users.  Newport continued efforts to enforce the differences 
between the two types of mooring permits facilitate accuracy in fee assessments and ratio 
reporting.  In addition to continued enforcement, clarifying the procedure for re-designation from 
private to commercial will further Newport‟s goal of achieving commercial: private balance. 
VI.     Resident: Non-Resident Ratio 
The Newport ordinance requires that residents be given a preference for mooring spaces 
over non-residents in a ratio of 3:1.  While that is the target ratio, the actual occupancy was 
estimated at 1:1 in the Harbor Plan.
138
  The discrepancy may be attributable to the fact that the 
ordinance does not adjust for any changes in residency after the mooring permit is initially 
granted.  While the mooring holder is required to “notify the harbormaster of any change of 
address,” the ordinance does not indicate the significance of such data beyond serving as the 
valid contact information for registration renewal.
139
   
One option of enforcing the 3:1 ratio is to require proof of residency upon each renewal 
in order for a private resident permittee to retain mooring benefits.  Adopting such a policy could 
be implemented using an explicit disclaimer that change in residency amounts to forfeiture.  It 
would also require a system for adding those who lose the residency preference to a waiting list 
for non-residents.   
The resident preference ratio is consistent with Newport‟s harbor management goals.  
Because Newport residents live closer to their moorings, they are more likely to put them to 
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optimum use.  Therefore, enforcing residency requirements for renewal would further Newport‟s 
goal of “achieving maximum sustainable benefits of moorings in Newport harbor,”140 which is 
discussed in further in Section VII of this report. 
The ratio is also consistent with CRMC limit that the ratio be no greater than 3:1.  
However, CRMC has explained that Army Corps rather than state policy applies to moorings 
within “federal navigation project” areas.141  In the federal project areas, the “open to all on a fair 
and equitable basis” standard applies.142  This creates some potential inconsistency, which would 
be resolved should the boundaries of the “federal project areas” be re-designated, as 
contemplated in the Harbor Plan.
143
  Because the applicability of the Corps policy is subject to 
change, the remainder of this section focuses on sources of law and policy other than the Corps‟ 
policies.  While all of Newport‟s moorings still remain subject to Corps jurisdiction per the 
Rhode Island General Permit, the permit does not contain an express “open to all” condition.144 
It is uncertain whether the PTD itself requires following an “open to all” policy.  There 
are three cases that are related to but far from decisive of the issue.  One decision from a federal 
district court in Maine invalidated a municipalities denial of a permit to a non-resident when 
there was no waiting list.
145
  Their reasoning was based on the fact that the 10% non-resident 
ratio employed should not apply unless it is actually benefiting residents.
146
  Where there were 
no residents vying for mooring space, the municipality could not arbitrarily refuse to grant 
permits to non-residents.  While not addressing resident preference, the Illinois Supreme Court 
faced the related issue of differential fees for residents and non-residents.
147
  It declined to decide 
the case based on the public trust doctrine, however, resorting to the Equal Protection Clause 
analysis explored below.
148
  Finally, New Jersey‟s interpretation of the PTD prohibits preferring 
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residents over non-residents.
149
  The New Jersey approach should be considered in light of their 
more expansive construction of state public trust law.
150
  Because of the lack of authorities on 
this issue, Rhode Island will charter its own course as it faces legal questions dependent on its 
resolution. 
Regardless of any Army Corps or PTD issues surrounding the residence preference, the 
policy must comport with relevant provisions of the United States Constitution.  Other harbor 
cities have faced Equal Protection challenges to their resident preference policies.  The Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents state and local law from irrationally 
distinguishing between two groups of people—here the resident and non-resident group.151  
Reviewing courts have given great deference to harbor cities, requiring only that the preference 
for non-residents serves a legitimate governmental purpose and the use of the ratio to implement 
the preference is rationally related to Newport‟s goals.152  This low level judicial scrutiny applies 
because “the right of access to mooring privileges is not a fundamental right” under the United 
States Constitution.
153
  
There are at least two rational reasons for Newport to prefer its residents over non-
residents.  First, as mentioned previously, residents may be more likely to make maximum use of 
the moorings throughout the season, which furthers Newport‟s harbor goals.154  Second, city 
residents may also legitimately preferred by local governments because they pay state taxes and 
contribute to the economy by employment, whereas non-residents do not.
155
  This second reason 
supports both the ratio preference and the fee difference of one hundred dollars.
156
  The United 
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States Supreme Court has explained that non-residents can be charged higher fees “based on both 
the added enforcement costs and the conservation expenditure supported by resident-borne 
taxes.”157  Specifically applying this rationale to mooring fees, the Supreme Court of Illinois 
stated that “if the mooring fees charged to both residents and nonresidents were the same, the 
residents of the park district would be paying a disproportionate share of the costs of maintaining 
the park district‟s services and facilities.”158 
Therefore, the resident: non-resident ratio is consistent with the Equal Protection Clause 
and with CRMC policy.  The preference for residents promotes the goal of increasing mooring 
utilization.  Requiring proof of residency for renewal of a resident mooring permit would further 
promote the utilization goal.  Additional methods of increasing utilization are discussed in the 
next section (VII). 
VII.     Mooring Underutilization 
Newport faces the constant challenge of mooring unavailability and delay, as witnessed 
by its long waiting lists.  The problem is further complicated by mooring underutilization.  
Specifically, some people on the waiting list wait over a decade for a mooring, while others  
have mooring rights but rarely use them.  Commercial moorings tend to be adequately utilized 
because the commercial permittee‟s profit depends on maximum utilization.  However, it is the 
private moorings that are grossly underutilized.  While private moorings serve to further 
permittee‟s exercise of public trust rights of navigation and fishing, underutilization calls into 
question whether or not such rights are actualized.  In doing so, underutilized moorings 
compromise Newport‟s goal of promoting “maximum sustainable usage of moorings and 
anchorages.”159  There are at least five situations leading to mooring underutilization; the 
permittee:  
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(1) the permittee has an alternative primary port and uses the Newport mooring only as a weekend visitor 
(14% of lessees);
160
 
(2) leaves the vessel in dry dock storage or otherwise not on the mooring (17%);
161
 
(3) uses the mooring for a minimal portion of the boating season;
162
  
(4) uses a low-value and unused “decoy vessel” to preserve the license without actual use;163 or 
(5) keeps the vessel at a dock, using the mooring only during storms.
164
 
 
Finally, moorings may become underused at the expense of the waiting list when private permits 
are issued to business entities rather than natural persons.  One way this occurs is when the 
mooring is registered to a vessel that is owned by a partnership.  The Commission addressed this 
issue in its March 10, 2011 appeal hearing for a mooring forfeiture.  The Newport resident 
permit holder decided to move out of state and stopped using the mooring.  In order to preserve it 
for himself should he choose to return to Newport (which he stated would not be until his 
retirement), he transferred the ownership of the registered vessel from himself to a partnership 
between himself and a Newport resident.  The two partners were not business partners.  In fact, 
they formed the partnership by a two sentence “Partnership Document” which they submitted as 
an un-notarized photo-copy.  The partner remaining in Newport already had his own mooring.  
Therefore, the partnership enabled avoidance of the waiting list procedure established by 
Newport ordinance, preserving the mooring for the non-resident partner for the future, while 
leaving a coveted mooring space unused.  These kinds of arrangements prevent others who 
dutifully complied with the waiting list procedure from achieving a long-awaited permit.  Other 
municipalities have enacted some protections against such abuses by clarifying  that joint 
ownership must appear on the original application, preventing adjustments to the business 
structure of the permittee that circumvent the goals of the mooring ordinances.
165
 
One approach to increasing maximum mooring utilization is habitual use requirements.  
The most stringent implementation of habitual use policy is a “use-or-forfeit” provision.  In 
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Beverly, Massachusetts, for example, a permittee suffers automatic permit revocation if he or she 
does not meet the habitual use requirement of 45 days between June 15
th
 and September 15
th
.
166
 
A less stringent approach is a “use-or-let-use” approach whereby the harbormaster is 
given the authority to make unused moorings available to transient boaters.
 167
  This has been 
implemented in Manchester-by-the-Sea, Massachusetts.
168
  The harbor regulations require that 
the registered vessel occupies the mooring for 60 days each season defined between June 1
st
 and 
October 1
st
.
169
  The permittee is required to notify the harbormaster if he or she does not expect 
to meet the habitual use condition.
170
  Upon notification, the habitual use requirement may be 
waived for one year.
171
  The ordinance only allows for one waiver, however, making future 
failure to meet the habitual use requirement grounds for forfeiture.
172
 
While enforcing habitual use requirements is unquestionably difficult, having a habitual 
use provision in an ordinance serves at least two purposes.  First, the mere presence of the 
requirement, despite lack of any enforcement mechanism akin to a parking meter, may compel at 
least some permittees to increase their mooring use or to decide to “let use” to avoid the risk of 
forfeiture, however slight.  Second, a habitual use provision provides a grounds for forfeiture is 
cases of the most obvious violations.  While the harbormaster could not be expected to count the 
mooring days of each boat, the provision gives the city the legal ability to remedy those violators 
who have not used the mooring for years.   
Under the use-or-let-use approach, if a city decides to offer an under-utilized mooring on 
a transient or seasonable basis, it could face added liability.  Because the city would be offering 
both the space and the mooring equipment to the transient or single-season user, it could be held 
responsible for damages associated with those moorings.
173
  Potential liability may further 
obligate the city to take on “providing security patrols, preventing chafing during storms and 
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assuring the general well-being of the vessel.”174  This is in contrast to Newport‟s liability under 
the current mooring regime where it acts only as the “surface manager,” with the permittee 
having ownership of, and therefore liability for, any damages associated with that mooring 
equipment. 
175
   
Another potential solution is allowing Newport yacht clubs to which a permittee belongs 
to offer the mooring through the yacht club in lieu of reciprocity benefits.  The Harbor Plan 
contemplates this solution: “private permit holders who are members of a yacht club be allowed 
to make their mooring available to their yacht club for the sole purpose of the club being able to 
offer „yacht club transient guest moorings‟ to other yacht clubs with which they have a 
„reciprocal privileges agreement.‟”176  This solution addresses the problem of underuse while 
maintaining the prohibition on receiving monetary compensation for use by others.  Instead, the 
lessee and the yacht club would receive the benefit of reciprocity privileges.   
Under the current ordinance, a permittee wishing to make his or her mooring available to 
the yacht club face two limiting provisions regulating use by vessels other than the one registered 
to the mooring.  Newport‟s ordinance allows use by non-registered vessels only if two 
requirements are met: (a) the 7/14 day time limit, and (b) prior written request by the mooring 
lessee.
177
   With the guarantee that permittee not receive compensation from the yacht club or the 
user, the time limit may prove to be an unnecessary restriction.  The second requirement is an 
inconvenience that may deter the mooring holder.  The option might be more desirable if the 
harbormaster was authorized accept a written request from the yacht club, acting as the lessee‟s 
agent.  Alternatively, the ordinance could specifically address the yacht club scenario, by 
requiring only one written request by the lessee to allow for future use by multiple reciprocating 
yacht club members.  One drawback of the yacht club solution is that its success depends entirely 
on the contract agreement between the yacht club and the mooring lessee.  If the yacht club 
decides it is not economical to assume the additional liability for aiding mooring use, the 
moorings will remain underutilized and out of the city‟s control. 
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Regarding users who are using the mooring only during storms, Newport could inform 
them of their other options.  The Harbor Plan contemplates establishing a temporary hurricane 
anchorage area in Coddington Cove.
178
  This could reduce the underuse problem for licensees 
who have docks available under normal weather conditions.  Newport‟s authorizing statute 
provides that in addition to its power to site permanent moorings, the city may designate both 
temporary mooring or anchorage areas, which supports Newport‟s ability to go forward with this 
recommended action.
179
 
While underutilization is a serious problem for Newport, it is not incurable.  Newport 
may explore habitual use requirements, including use-or-forfeit or use-or-let-use strategies.  
Alternatively, Newport may avoid incurring any additional liability by allowing yacht clubs to 
offer members‟ moorings for reciprocity benefits.  Whichever solution Newport adopts, 
maximizing use of existing moorings will greatly improve the mooring system‟s promotion of 
public trust uses as well as maintain favorable public perception in the system‟s fairness. 
VIII.     Mooring Fee Profit and The Maritime Enterprise Fund 
This section explores the how mooring fee profits are managed in Newport‟s Maritime 
Enterprise Fund (MEP), with some useful comparisons to fund administration in Newport.  This 
section also addresses whether profit-making is consistent with the PTD. 
The proceeds from mooring fees are deposited into Newport‟s MEP. 180   Enterprise funds 
are an accounting mechanism by which a city providing a particular service, like harbor 
management, retains control of the revenues the service, rather than dispensing the revenue into 
the city‟s general fund. 181  The funds in the MEP cover the Harbor‟s operating expenses, with 
any surplus (profits) becoming available for harbor development projects.
 182
  This fund 
management benefit is achieved by separate accounting ledgers but not necessarily by separation 
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of funds among several bank accounts.
183
  Enterprise Funds are regarded as a business for 
purposes of government accounting practices. 
The Army Corps of Engineers also speaks to the revenue rules.  The agency objects to 
fees that are not a reflection of the cost of administering a mooring area.
 184
  This no-profit 
policy, like the open-to-all policy, is not stated in the conditions for Rhode Island‟s General 
Permit for issuing mooring licenses, but may apply in the federal navigation project areas subject 
to upcoming change.   The question of whether Newport‟s profit practices meet the 
proportionality requirement is complicated by the MEP system for two reasons.  First, the MEP 
combines profits from other harbor fines and fees, the city‟s mooring rentals, and cruise ships.  
Second, the funds are used for a variety of costs that are not exclusive to the mooring program: 
e.g. paperwork, harbor master duties, harbor staff during peak season.   
The proportionality requirement is not universally recognized.  While some jurisdictions 
hold that the fees must be proportional to the actual cost of implementing the program, many 
decisions are based on an applicable state statute setting forth a proportionality standard.
185
  The 
applicable Rhode Island statute for Newport‟s authority to charge mooring fees does not include 
any requirement that the fees be proportional to the cost of implementing the program.  By 
contrast, Massachusetts has adopted proportionality requirement by statute.
186
  Because of such 
difference in state law, the Rhode Island Supreme Court specifically cautioned against confusion, 
urging “great caution” when applying out-of-state cases to Rhode Island issues.187   
                                                          
183
 See Massachusetts Department of Revenue, Division of Local Services, Bureau of Accounts, Informational 
Guideline Release 08-101, Enterprise Funds G.L. c. 44, § 53F ½, pg. 36 (April 2008).  The Guideline Release also 
indicates that the “department operating the enterprise is not a separate and distinct legal entity”.  Id. at 37.  The 
legal implication is that one department or the City Council is held liable for tort or contract claim, creditors whose 
claims are not satisfied by the relevant enterprise fund would be able to reach any of the city‟s other unrelated 
enterprise funds.  See generally 18 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 63 (West 2011). 
184
 R.I. Admin. Code 16-1-13-B (West 2010). 
185
 See, e.g. Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass‟n v. Atlantis Beach Club, 851 A.2d 19, 33 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2004).  The 
distinction between a statutory basis for invalidating fees and a public trust basis for doing so can be confusing.  
Raleigh exemplifies this by quoting the state statute right in the middle of a public trust discussion.   
186
 M.G.L.A. 91 § 10A (West 2011), available at 
http://www.malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/PartI/TitleXIV/Chapter91/Section10A  (“A reasonable fee for 
such mooring permit, proportionate to the city or town‟s cost of overseeing mooring  permits, may be imposed by 
the city or town or whoever is so authorized by the city or town.”) 
187
 Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. Rhode Island, 657 A.2d 1038, 1042 (R.I. Sup. Ct. 1995), quoting 
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 US 1, 26 (1894), available at 
http://www.rhodeislandpropertylaw.com/uploads/file/Greater%20Providence%20Chamber%20Case(1).pdf. 
35 
 
Another problem in trying to apply the proportionality cases is that their underlying 
regulatory concern is often with the reasonableness of the fees rather than the fact that the city is 
making a profit.
188
  Therefore, the real determination of validity of the fees under the PTD should 
depend on whether the fees are so high that they are unreasonably prohibiting the exercise of 
public trust rights for those who cannot pay, not on whether the city is making profits.  
Recognizing these distinctions, the Supreme Court of Illinois, after pointing out the fact that its 
relevant state statute also lacked any proportionality limit, concluded that nothing in the PTD 
itself prevents the city to make profit on mooring fees.
189
  The court recognized the need for 
harbor cities to raise revenues for successful harbor management and upheld profit-producing 
mooring fees based on a reasonableness standard.
190
  Therefore, the real issue is whether the fee 
is reasonable in light of an average boat owner‟s ability to pay, rather than in comparison to the 
cost of administering the program. 
Furthermore, some states that have required proportionality have construed it broadly.  
The New Jersey Supreme Court, for example, allows municipalities to calculate beach use fees 
based on a wide-range of beach-related costs outside the cost of implementing the specific beach 
fee program.
191
  These include “all additional costs legitimately attributable to the operation and 
maintenance of the beachfront.”192  The court gave several examples of what the city could 
include in its fee calculation, including all operating and personnel expenses, outstanding debt 
related to beach improvement, and annual reserve to cover anticipated expenses relating to beach 
improvement.
193
 
While the PTD does not necessarily invalidate Newport‟s collection of profits, it may 
impose the requirement that the profits be expended to improve the public trust resource.  For 
example, the Supreme Florida Court explained that while “the public trust doctrine…does not 
prohibit local governments from imposing reasonable user fees for [public trust resource] access, 
                                                          
188
 Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 55 (N.J.1972) (“The rationale behind [the statutory 
proportionality requirement] certainly is that such municipalities may properly pass on some or all of the financial 
burden, as they decide, by imposing reasonable beach user fees”)(emphasis supplied). 
189
 Broeckl v. Chicago Park Dist., 544 N.E.2d 792, 794 (Ill. 1989).  The public trust doctrine applies to navigable 
lakes.  See, e.g. Nat‟l Audubon Soc‟y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983) 
(discussing the “public trust doctrine which, after evolving as a shield for the protection of tidelands, now extends its 
protective scope to navigable lakes”). 
190
 Id. 
191
 Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 55 (N.J. 1972). 
192
 Id. 
36 
 
so long as the revenue is expended solely for the protection and welfare of the public using that 
[public trust resource], as well as for improvements that will enhance the public‟s use of the 
sovereign property” (emphasis supplied).194  Fortunately, that is exactly what the MEP 
facilitates.  The MEP is designed to ensure that the profits from mooring fees are expended in 
ways that improve the Harbor.  Because the MEP is used to keep profits for use of the public 
beneficiaries of the public trust doctrine, the MEP might be likened to a trust account.  Similar to 
Newport‟s MEP, San Diego‟s harbor fund has been said to “constitute a trust fund for the 
furtherance of navigation and commerce, in which were to be placed all revenues derived from 
tideland leases and franchises, and other income from  harbor improvements, to be devoted to the 
purposes of the trust.”195 
While the MEP is generally administered consistent with this trust responsibility, there 
seem to be two exceptions to the requirement that funds in the MEP be used for harbor 
management and development.  First, the Newport Department of Economic Development has 
the ability to draw from the MEP for indirect costs, in order to fund either harbor-related 
expenses
196
 (e.g. seawalls) or municipal costs that cannot be attributed to use by a single 
enterprise
197
 (e.g. city solicitor).  There is no corollary benefit assuring that other funds would 
reimburse the Harbor Fund for its use of harbor services.
198
  For example, the harbormaster 
responds to incidents at piers, docks, and marinas without any compensation from the General 
Fund.  The General Fund receives tax revenues from the marinas, with the tax-payers receiving 
the benefit of the harbormaster‟s Services.  Second, undercapitalized funds may be able to 
“borrow” from other funds.199  The latter aspect is vested in the authority of the Department of 
Economic Development.
200
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In contrast to the administration of the MEP, enterprise funds under Massachusetts law 
are administered in accordance with a codified comprehensive scheme for municipal enterprise 
funds.
201
  This system replaced the state‟s old system of diverse acts for each proposed fund.202  
The statute also expanded the municipalities‟ flexibility in administering their funds, authorizing 
indirect costs, capital improvements, and fixed assets.  Pursuant to the statute, cities or town can 
create an enterprise fund by vote of the city‟s legislative branch (e.g. the City Council).203  The 
Enterprise Fund annual budget must be approved by the city‟s executive branch is then subject to 
approval by the city‟s executive branch (e.g. the Governor) and the legislative branch.204 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which also has jurisdiction over federal 
Rhode Island case, favorably cited to the Waterways Management Enterprise Fund established 
by the City of Dartmouth.
205
  After explaining “the fund is financed by a waterways use fee,” the 
court applied the benefits of enterprise fund management system to its analysis of a claim that 
the user fees were unreasonable.
206
  The appeals court held that the fees were reasonable in part 
because they were being used solely for waterway-related expenses.
207
   
Like Newport‟s MEP, Massachusetts has also faced some of the problems associated 
with allocation of indirect costs not attributable to one single city enterprise.  The Massachusetts 
Bureau of Accounts recommends that “every community with an enterprise fund establish a 
written, internal policy regarding indirect cost allocation,” to be reviewed annually.208   
The MEP serves as an effective means of ensuring that mooring profits are used for other 
public trust purposes in the harbor.  This benefit to the public trust resource and the 
reasonableness of the fees for paying boat owners are evidence of the fees‟ compliance with the 
PTD.   
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IX.     Conclusion 
The legal and policy issues facing Newport as it revises and implements its ordinances 
are numerous.  Most of the issues have not been squarely resolved for Rhode Island.  While 
Newport may take guidance from other states, it will be Rhode Island‟s task going forward to 
define the reach of its PTD as applied to some novel issues raised by mooring administration.  
The benefit of the flexibility of the PTD is allowing smaller units of government like Newport to 
define their regulatory goals based on a locally-tailored balancing test of competing interests 
facing scare ocean resources.  This report was designed to facilitate decision-maker discussion of 
how to strike that delicate balance. 
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Appendix A: Reference Guide for Comparing Other Municipalities’ Ordinances 
RHODE ISLAND HARBOR PLAN LINK ORDINANCES LINK 
Barrington http://72.46.3.26/harbor/HarborMgt
Plan01-05-09complete.pdf 
 
Bristol http://www.bristolri.us/harbor/harbo
rmgmtplan.php 
http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=10105&sta
teId=39&stateName=Rhode%20Island 
Jamestown  http://www.jamestownri.net/harbor/HMO/Harbor_Ordinanc
e_2004.pdf 
Narragansett http://narragansettri.gov/admin/Do
cumentView.aspx?DID=416&DL=1 
http://library4.municode.com:80/default-
now/template.htm?view=browse&doc_action=setdoc&doc_
keytype=tocid&doc_key=46385008ec6f4f2d7bea6a7aa1c1
a451&infobase=11204 
Newport http://www.cityofnewport.com/depa
rtments/economic-
development/harbor/pdf/HMP_01-
2010.pdf 
  
North Kingstown http://www.northkingstown.org/site
s/northkingstown.org/files/pdf-
attachments/harbor_management
_plan_2007.pdf 
http://library4.municode.com:80/default-
test/template.htm?view=browse&doc_action=setdoc&doc_
keytype=tocid&doc_key=753045e315ba7ccc272bb4e126a
6fae8&infobase=11995 
Providence  http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=11458&sta
teId=39&stateName=Rhode%20Island 
South Kingstown  http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=14928&sta
teId=39&stateName=Rhode%20Island 
Tiverton  http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=12864&sta
teId=39&stateName=Rhode%20Island 
Warren http://www.townofwarren-
ri.gov/images/Harbor_Managemen
t_Plan_Updated_Jan_2010.pdf 
 
Warwick http://www.warwickri.gov/pdfs/plan
ning/Harbor%20Management%20
Plan.pdf 
http://www.warwickri.gov/pdfs/officialdocs/CH024%20-
%20Chapter%2024%20%20HARBORS.pdf 
 
MASSACHUSETTS 
 
HMP LINK 
 
ORDINANCE LINK 
Barnstable  http://www.town.barnstable.ma.us/HarborMaster/Mooring%
20Regulations.pdf 
Beverly  http://www.harbormasters.org/cgi-
bin/search/proxy.cgi?terms=mooring&url=http%3A%2F%2
Fwww.harbormasters.org%2Fbeverly%2Fmoorreg.htm 
Bourne  http://www.townofbourne.com/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=XO
aIPoDVgek%3D&tabid=157&mid=819 
Chatham http://www.town.chatham.ma.us/P
ublic_Documents/ChathamMA_Co
astal/tocscpdocs 
http://www.chatham-
ma.gov/Public_Documents/ChathamMA_Harbor/regulation
s/MOORINGREGS2008.pdf 
Cohasset  http://www.townofcohasset.org/harbormaster/harbor_rules
_regs.pdf 
Duxbury http://www.town.duxbury.ma.us/pu
blic_documents/DuxburyMA_BCo
mm/BayManagementplanJune200
5.pdf 
http://www.duxburyharbormaster.org/Mooringrules.htm 
Eastham  http://www.eastham-
ma.gov/Public_Documents/EasthamMA_Resources/moori
ng%20regulations%20abstract%202008.pdf 
Falmouth http://www.uhi.umb.edu/pdf_files/d
raft_green_pond_aug_20_09.pdf 
http://www.falmouthmass.us/depart.php?depkey=harbor 
Gloucester http://www.uhi.umb.edu/pdf_files/C
ity%20of%20Gloucester%20Harbo
r%20Plan%20July%202009.pdf 
 
Hingham http://www.hingham-
ma.gov/document/Harbor_Master_
Plan_Report.pdf 
http://www.hingham-ma.gov/harbormaster/bylaw.html 
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Hull http://www.town.hull.ma.us/Public_
Documents/HullMA_HarborManag
eCom/Harbor%20Management%2
0Plan.pdf 
 
Ipswich  http://www.ipswichpolice.org/Files/MOORING%20REGUL
ATIONS%202011.pdf  
Lynn http://ediclynn.org/misc/Final%20M
HP%20Document.pdf 
 
Manchester by the Sea http://www.manchester.ma.us/Pages/manchesterma_harb
or/Regs.pdf 
Marblehead  http://www.marblehead.org/DocumentView.aspx?DID=249
1 
Marshfield  http://www.townofmarshfield.org/public_documents/marshfi
eldma_harbor/MarshfieldmooringSkiffregulations.pdf 
Nantucket http://www.uhi.umb.edu/pdf_files/N
antucket_Madaket_Harbors_Actio
n_Plan_2009.pdf 
http://www.nantucket-
ma.gov/pages/nantucketma_marine/harborregs.pdf 
New Bedford http://www.newbedford-
ma.gov/PortofNewBedford/hdc/Fin
al%20complete%207-15-
09%20(web%20version).pdf 
http://www.newbedford-
ma.gov/PortofNewBedford/hdc/Mooring%20Regulations%
20NB.pdf 
Plymouth  http://www.nantucket-
ma.gov/pages/nantucketma_marine/harborregs.pdf 
Province Town http://www.uhi.umb.edu/pdf_files/p
rovincetown.pdf 
 
Quincy  http://www.quincyma.gov/CityOfQuincy_Content/document
s/MooringRegs2007.pdf 
Rockport http://www.uhi.umb.edu/pdf_files/R
ockport_Harbor_Plan.pdf 
http://www.harbormasters.org/rockport/mooring.shtml 
Salem http://www.salem.com/pages/salemma_dpcd/studiesrephtt
p://www.salem.com/pages/salemma_dpcd/studiesreports/2
008%20salem%20Harbor%20plan.pdf 
Salisbury http://www.uhi.umb.edu/pdf_files/S
alisbury_Management_Plan_Oct0
8.pdf 
 
Sandwich  http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=11521&sta
teId=21&stateName=Massachusetts 
Scituate  http://www.town.scituate.ma.us/harbormaster/mooringregs.
html 
Winthrop  http://www.town.winthrop.ma.us/pages/WinthropMA_Harbo
r/rules_regs 
 
 
 
 
